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Thomas Jefferson seldom read novels, but his opinions about fiction 
were definite; he once wrote: 
A great obstacle to good education is the inordinate pas-
sion prevalent for novels, and the time lost in that reading 
which should be instructively employed. When this poison 
infects the mind, it destroys its tone and revolts it against 
wholesome reading. Reason and fact, plain and unadorned, 
are rejected.1 
Although usually deplored by literary historians, Jefferson's antipathy to 
fiction—at least American fiction—was perhaps justified. No one can de-
fend the native novels available for his perusal. The sobs of Charlotte 
Temple, the Long Island Gothic of Alonzo and Melissa, or the somber 
silliness of The Algerine Captive make for notoriously unsatisfactory read-
ing. However, the Jeffersonian era roughly coincides with the beginnings 
of the American novel; between William Hill Brown's The Power of Sym-
pathy (1789) and James Fenimore Cooper's The Spy (1821), the novel 
was established in America as a literary form. As feeble as this beginning 
is, it has value for the student of American thought. Although rejected by 
Jefferson and most of his contemporaries, the early American novel has 
great importance as an intellectual document illustrating significant 
changes in the history of American ideas. 
The fledgling American novel illuminates a contemporary tension be-
tween Neo-classical values and an incipient, unfulfilled Romanticism;2 
moreover, the two novelists of most interest in the Jeffersonian era, 
Charles Brockden Brown and Hugh Henry Brackenridge, best record this 
tension. Although their esthetic merits are often doubtful, Brown and 
Brackenridge have a special value as delineators of a changing world view. 
Both struggled in their novels with a world which was tentatively reject-
ing a Neo-classic, rational system of absolute, unchanging order for a Ro-
mantic, often non-rational, organic system of uncertain order. 
The end of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth 
were characterized by difficult tensions in the United States. The country 
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had successively transformed itself from colony to Revolutionary coalition, 
to Confederacy, to Federal Republic, each mutation attended by contro-
versy. Even after the establishment of a Federal government, the Hamil-
ton-Jefferson, Federalist-Republican disputes seriously threatened the gov-
ernmental structure. Americans were in wide disagreement about states 
rights and individual rights, relations with England and relations with 
France, embargoes and impressments. Traditional Calvinism had de-
clined ungracefully amidst bellicose quarrels with Unitarianism and 
Deism, but its influence was still pervasive, as proven by the attacks on 
Jefferson's suspected Deism. Americans were slowly becoming aware of 
certain radical suggestions from Europe: the Kantian challenge to Lock-
ean empiricism had upset traditional standards of perception, Wordsworth 
had ridiculed the very language of established literature. Despite an "Era 
of Good Feelings" following the War of 1812, the Jefïersonian epoch was 
a period of philosophic and political uncertainty when men were uneasy 
about their world; the well-oiled, well-explained, finely running watch of 
the eighteenth century mechanical universe was falling apart. When 
Brown and Brackenridge begin to write in this atmosphere, their writings 
dramatically inform these tensions: their novels polarize the extremes of 
American ideas by documenting the encroachments of Romanticism upon 
established Neo-classicism. Brackenridge, remarkably cognizant of the 
threat to his Neo-classical ideas, fights a losing battle against the onslaught 
of unreasonable, unchecked Romantic individualism, yet never swerves in 
his support of democratic government. Brown, intuitively aware of a 
Romantic emphasis upon the non-rational processes of the imagination, 
exploits irrational individualism. By examining these novelists' atti-
tudes towards the individual's capacity for rational thought, the mind's 
ability to reason by ordering experience, we discover the value of their 
novels as intellectual documents of a philosophically changing age. 
i 
Hugh Henry Brackenridge has been said to represent "more com-
pletely and more vitally than any other [writer of his period] the classi-
cal and eighteenth century ideals of sanity and moderation."3 Born in 
Scotland in 1748, Brackenridge lived and wrote by eighteenth century 
ideals; the rambling, often unreadable Modern Chivalry frequently 
sounds like a Joshua Reynolds discourse: "The great secret of preserving 
respect, is the cultivating and shewing to the best advantage the powers 
that we possess, and not going beyond them. Everything in its element is 
good, and in their proper sphere all natures and capacities are excel-
lent."4 Such a statement of the Neo-classical doctrines of proportion and 
subordination makes clear why the book has been called the "most com-
plete . . . expression of the neo-classical spirit in the new nation."5 
Yet Modem Chivalry, published in various installments between 1792 
and 1815, has too often been misread as a treatise of Neo-classic principles; 
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the novel also confirms the existence of a Romantic attack upon Neo-
classic rationalism, an attack which, surprisingly, almost always succeeds 
within the rhetorical pattern of the novel. Instead of writing a novel in 
praise of those eighteenth century ideals which he considered essential to 
a successful democracy, Brackenridge composed a Swiftian satire in which 
he despairs of a triumph for reason and common sense. Although it has 
been claimed that there is "no principle of plot construction" controlling 
Modern Chivalry/' a very clear principle becomes manifest, and it is not 
necessarily a principle supporting the "ideal of sanity." The book's con-
sistent narrative sequence is: (1) the humorous description of an absurd, 
irrational proposal, (2) an appeal to reason in argument against that ir-
rational proposal, (3) the failure of reason to change men's minds or to 
ridicule the situation, (4) a capitulation to irrationality through a new 
mode of unreasoned argument which (5) does change men's minds, and 
ironically, defeats the absurd proposal, and (6) a chapter of authorial 
commentary discussing the folly of the previous sequence. Paradoxically, 
it is only by forgetting to be reasonable that Brackenridge's advocate of 
reason, Captain Farrago, is able to effect change. Although obviously 
Brackenridge did not intend it, Modern Chivalry documents the efficacy 
of non-reason in dealing with a world where the unexplainable, irrational 
act can be successfully proposed. The novel argues, despairingly, that the 
democratic process usually supports the non-rational solution to political 
problems. While Brackenridge's despair is never absolute, since he con-
tinues to find solace in the ideals of democratic theory, Modern Chivalry 
serves more to prove his bewilderment when confronted by a seemingly 
insane world than to affirm his faith in a reasoned, ordered system of hu-
man government. 
Alexander Cowie remarks accurately that the "pretense of fiction be-
comes extremely shadowy toward the end" of Modern Chivalry,7 and the 
novel's reputation rests largely on the first two volumes published in 1792. 
Captain Farrago, a man "of good natural sense" (p. 11), begins a journey 
across the countryside accompanied by his servant, the Irish bog-trotter, 
Teague Oregan; the Captain's purpose is "to see how things were going on 
here and there and to observe human nature." (p. 6) From his very first 
encounter, what Captain Farrago discovers "going on" is irrational: he is 
unable to convince a group of country jockeys that the common plough 
horse serving as his mount "can scarce go beyond a trot." (p. 6) They in-
sist, since a horse race is about to commence, "that the horse was what 
they called a bite and that under the appearance of leanness and stiffness 
there was concealed some hidden quality of swiftness uncommon." (p. 7) 
This disturbing evidence of absurdity, of people refusing to recognize the 
truth when it stands in front of them, is quickly confirmed by a series of 
episodes which the Captain can only interpret as arising from a world 
gone mad. In short order, the uneducated, illiterate Teague Oregan al-
most becomes a member of the state legislature, a member of the American 
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Philosophical Society, a Presbyterian minister and a bogus chief of the 
Kickapoo Indians. 
Brackenridge establishes in these first volumes a narrative strategy for 
his novel, and the famous episode in which Teague is proposed as a can-
didate for the legislature illustrates the pattern well. Coming upon a 
number of people meeting to elect a state legislator, the Captain is ap-
palled to find they prefer an ignorant weaver over a man of education. 
He logically points out that: 
There is no analogy between knoting threads and fram-
ing laws. It would be a reversion of the order of things. Not 
that a manufacturer of linen or woolen, or other stuff, is an 
inferior character, but a different one, from that which 
ought to be employed in affairs of state, (p. 14) 
Concerned for "the order of things," he argues for the Neo-classical prin-
ciple of subordination by telling the weaver: "You are not furnished with 
those common place ideas with which even very ignorant men can pass for 
knowing something. There is nothing makes a man so ridiculous as to at-
tempt what is above his sphere." (p. 14) To the Captain, the reasonable-
ness of his discourse has been self-evident: "It is unnecessary to enlarge on 
this subject; for you must all be convinced of the truth and propriety of 
what I say." (p. 14) But the people are not convinced; indeed, they re-
main so unconvinced that before the Captain realizes the danger, the 
fickle public with an alarming "disposition to what is new and ignoble" 
has proposed Teague as a candidate, (p. 15) Again the Captain appeals 
to reason: 
This is making the matter still worse, gentlemen: this 
servant of mine is but a bog-trotter; who can scarcely speak 
the dialect in which your laws ought to be written; but cer-
tainly has never read a single treatise on any political sub-
ject; for the truth is, he cannot read at all . . . he is totally ig-
norant of the great principles of legislation . . . A free gov-
ernment is a noble possession to a people . . . Though doubt-
less, in such a government, the lowest citizen may become 
chief magistrate; yet it is sufficient to possess the right; not 
absolutely necessary to exercise it. (p. 15) 
But again, the Captain's sensible appeal fails. In the face of absurdity, he 
is forced into an irrational appeal. Describing what will happen when 
Teague takes his office, the Captain foregoes the reasonable argument, 
capitulates to the same sort of public irrationality that could propose 
Teague as a candidate, and tells his servant: 
When a man becomes of a public body, he is like a ra-
coon, or other beast that climbs upon the fork of a tree; the 
boys pushing at him with pitch-forks, or throwing stones or 
shooting at him with an arrow, the dogs barking in the mean 
time . . . For I would not for a thousand guineas, though I 
have not the half of it to spare, that the breed of the Oregans 
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should come to this; bringing on them a worse stain than 
stealing sheep; to which they are addicted, (p. 17) 
The Captain has not become irrational himself, of course, but sarcastic; 
his conclusions, however, are irrational, and these conclusions are ac-
cepted as rational by Teague, the public's representative. Convinced that 
public office would be a more odious occupation than sheep stealing, 
Teague declines the nomination, and almost immediately the "implied 
narrator,"8 the fictional "observer" who is obviously Brackenridge him-
self, steps forward to offer a chapter of "reflections" about the nature of 
democratic government and the perils of electing unqualified men to 
office. 
The narrative pattern in this episode is clear: confronted with an ab-
surd proposal, the Captain appeals to reason and common sense; this ap-
peal fails and he resorts to irrational arguments (state office is a worse 
stain than sheep stealing), and, ironically, is effective. The narrator's "re-
flections" make it especially obvious, of course, that this pattern operates 
within the structure of satire, and that Brackenridge deplores such a non-
sensical world. But the irrational world is consistently revealed as the 
dominant world in Modern Chivalry, and through the rest of the novel it 
is only by irrational appeals that Captain Farrago is able to keep Teague 
from positions he is unsuited for. Farrago's argument against Teague's 
joining the American Philosophical Society leads directly to an irrational 
conclusion, but it seems the only way to convince Teague to reject his 
membership: 
It is a fine thing at first sight to be a philosopher and get 
into this body . . . But do you think it is to make a philoso-
pher of you that they want you? Far from it. It is their great 
study to find curiosities; and because this man saw you com-
ing after me, with a red head trotting like an Esquimaux 
Indian, it has struck his mind to pick you up, and pass you 
for one. Nay, it is possible, they may intend worse; and 
when they have examined you awhile, take the skin off you, 
and pass you for an overgrown otter, or a musk-rat; or some 
outlandish animal, for which they will themselves, invent a 
name. (p. 26) 
In a similar fashion, after his logical arguments have failed, the Captain 
persuades Teague not to become a Presbyterian minister, for when he 
finally goes to hell, he can "expect but little quarter [from the devil] after 
abusing him in this world," (p. 39) and he counsels Teague against be-
coming a bogus Indian Chief in the employ of an unscrupulous treaty-
maker, not because the act would be dishonest, but because Teague's red-
headed scalp will become a tobacco pouch for some rival chief. Finally, 
only an irrational argument can convince Teague that he should not 
marry an ugly, middle-aged inn-keeper; the Captain tells him that she "is 
the greatest witch that ever run . . . It is God's mercy, that she has not 
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changed herself into an alligator, and eat you up before the morning." 
(pp. 96-97) 
Even if this rhetorical pattern affirming a pervasive irrationality were 
not so obvious in Modern Chivalry, additional evidence proves that the 
irrational is the book's major concern. Time after time, the world is re-
ferred to as a madhouse, inhabited by madmen; the Captain asks the elec-
torate, "What can be the madness that possesses you?" (p. 333) A 
preacher, observing the operations of popular democracy, cries out "Oh; 
monstrous! The folly, the fury, the madness of the populace!" (p. 373); a 
group of peace officers tell the Captain, "A madness prevails at present 
. . . When the people get a thing into their heads, the best way is to let 
them go on. They will come to themselves by and by." (p. 375) Captain 
Farrago, as a governor in the 1805 volume, must periodically wait for 
people to come to their senses: 
The governor considered all this as but madness and 
fanaticism, yet he did not discourage the bog-trotter in his 
freaks; nor interfere with the people in their visions, and 
extacies; knowing that the phrenzy after a time will always 
dissipate. . . . (p. 609) 
Clearly, Brackenridge is saying that often the excesses of popular demo-
cratic government are insane, that the people are seldom coaxed out of 
their madness by voices of common sense. Indeed, the novel's repository 
of common sense is not primarily Captain Farrago, who constantly capit-
ulates to the irrational method, but the "implied narrator" of the many 
chapters labeled "Concerning Reflections," or "Concerning Observa-
tions." Always a voice of reason, this figure usually feels compelled to 
comment on irrational scenes, and his commentary, surprisingly free of 
irony or satire, presents the rational, orderly solution to each episode; it 
is this figure who offers Neo-classical principles, and he is never a part of 
the fictional narrative, perhaps because he speaks for Brackenridge him-
self.9 
Modern Chivalry is a novel in which fiction argues for one kind of 
truth—the Captain never succeeds on rational terms, and at book's end has 
given up and permitted Teague to become a judge—and authorial com-
mentary suggests another. Intended to plead for the desirable, Neo-clas-
sical ideal of a stable, coherent existence, Brackenridge's novel exposes an 
irrational world, a world where a bog-trotter can be a statesman, philoso-
pher and judge, all through the consent of the rabble. Brackenridge 
seriously attacks the pretentions of the uneducated masses, and he inter-
prets those pretentions in terms of a changing world view. Modern Chiv-
alry illustrates the apparent failure of Neo-classical rationalism to check 
uninhibited, unreasonable democratic individualism. This undesirable 
individualism, lampooned and yet confirmed as the dominant voice of the 
new America, is primarily a Romantic individualism; while Wordsworth 
was asserting the inherent dignity of Cumberland peasants, Brackenridge 
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was assailing American egalitarians who held that Pennsylvania frontiers-
men were capable of enlightened legislation. Brackenridge felt that he was 
exposing an irrational world, but he really only confronted, and despaired 
of, that nineteenth century Romantic world which was confounding 
Western civilization in his time. His countrymen had begun to define 
themselves differently toward a whole set of supposedly inviolable prin-
ciples inherited from English Neo-classicism: decorum, subordination, 
rationality, proportion; Brackenridge felt strongly that such redefinition 
constituted a threat to the orderly processes of living and the reasonable 
functioning of democratic government. Charles Brockden Brown, writing 
at almost the same time, recognized this same irrational, rather frighten-
ing world, but he welcomed its irrationality. He created the American 
novel's first investigation of the new, Romantic forces which offered hope 
of a different kind of order for a changing, uncertain world. 
ii 
It is a commonplace to describe the difference between Romanticism 
and Neo-classicism as a difference in cosmography.10 The writers of the 
eighteenth century "had been able to assume as their frame of reference 
a concept of an ordered and stable universe , ,n and this concept of order 
was apprehended by the reason, the principal human faculty. But at the 
end of the eighteenth century this stable universe no longer sufficed. As 
R. A. Foakes says: "By the end of the eighteenth century the disparity 
between the ideal order and the world in which men lived had become so 
great, the ideal so meaningless, as to destroy its usefulness even as a 
myth."12 Reason no longer functioned as the defining faculty for a world 
which so often proposed non-rational dilemmas, and the quest of the 
writer was to make "order out of chaos."13 Brackenridge recognized this 
chaos and sought a return to the stable, mechanical universe of Neo-
classicism; his contemporary, Charles Brockden Brown, unsuccessfully 
searched for a new system of order. In four major novels, Brown sought 
for some explanation of individual mental aberrations, for motivations in 
irrational acts. In the process, he too documented Romantic intrusions 
upon the Neo-classical position. 
All of Brown's novels were written between 1798 and 1801; they have 
often been called somewhat "Romantic" by literary critics,14 but no one 
has really explained why this label should be attached. I believe that 
Brown's novels are "Romantic" because he creates dilemmas which are 
insoluble through Neo-classical principles of coherence and rationality. 
Brown's novels are Romantic because he implies that irrationality is the 
governing force in human affairs, and that man's efforts at ordering exist-
ence, his presumptions of an ability to reason, are self-delusive. In each 
of his major novels, Brown's characters cannot rationally explain what 
has happened to them; they consistently try, since they subscribe to a Neo-
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classical value system, but their attempts are foiled by the nature of real-
ity itself. 
Brown's first novel, Wieland, best illustrates his achievement. Theo-
dore Wieland, a religious fanatic, murders his wife and children under the 
influence of a (presumed) divine command; he also attempts to slay his 
sister, and finally commits suicide. His sister, Clara, is left to tell his story 
and attempt to make sense out of the horrible events. Her conclusions 
are, however, that none of these mysterious happenings can be explained, 
that rationality cannot order these events into a logical sequence of cause 
and effect. 
Clara Wielancl, as often noted, is a product of Neo-classical, Lockean 
empiricism.15 A student of reason, she is initially confident that her 
brother's delusions have a rational explanation: her brother hears voices, 
and Clara is convinced that the voices have come from the sinister ven-
triloquist, Carwin. She is partially right, but Carwin's confession of his 
biloquial deeds at the end of the novel includes a denial of the death com-
mand (which the facts of the novel confirm),16 and his ventriloquism does 
not explain why Theodore attempts to kill Clara, why Theodore commits 
suicide, why Clara has incoherent dreams about her brother, or even why 
Carwin himself seems so committed to evil designs. 
Lockean psychology postulated the validity of sense experience as the 
means to knowledge. The mind as a tabula rasa discovered truth through 
sensory encounters, and digested by the understanding, these sense impres-
sions became the basis for rational action. But Clara Wieland's discovery 
is that the senses cannot be trusted, that they are often delusive. Her rea-
soning faculties become virtually useless when confronted with abnormal 
events, and the philosophical implications to her quandary are significant. 
If one can no longer depend on the senses as the means to knowledge, then 
the world is full of improbable and incomprehensible phantoms. Clara's 
belief in the utility of the senses dies hard because its alternative requires 
such a difficult assumption, yet the inadequacy of the senses as a means to 
knowledge is confirmed by every experience she has. 
The assault upon the efficacy of her senses as the source of knowledge, 
upon the foundation of Clara's reason itself, is the dominant narrative 
motif in Wieland. Time after time she asks "can my senses deceive me," 
and the answer is almost always that they can and have; moreover, the 
deception is not due to any depravity in her senses, but to the very nature 
of her experience. The senses, operating through the understanding, 
should posit knowledge of an ordered, non-chaotic world, but in the be-
wildering denouement of Wieland, when events defy a "reasonable" ex-
planation, Clara's world has become irrational—incapable of imposed 
order. Confronted by a mysterious man of evil, Carwin, and a raving luna-
tic who was once her gentle, loving brother, Clara admits the "impotence" 
of her reason for dealing with either one: 
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My reason taught me that his [Carwin's] conclusions were 
right; but conscious of the impotence of reason over my own 
conduct; conscious of my cowardly rashness and my criminal 
despair, I doubted whether any one could be stedfast and 
wise.17 
Her psychic shock is so great, in fact, that she no longer cares what the 
explanation for their actions might be. She tells her readers that they 
must place their own interpretation upon events, for her reasoned efforts 
to do so have failed: 
Talk not to me, O my revered friend! of Carwin. He has 
told thee his tale, and thou exculpatest him from all direct 
concern in the fate of Wieland. This scene of havock was 
produced by an illusion of the senses. Be it so: I care not 
from what source these disasters have flowed; it suffices that 
they have swallowed up our hopes and our existence, (p. 
261) 
This final attitude of Clara Wieland is the dramatic reversal of the 
preconceptions with which she began her tale, and it marks her realization 
of irrationality in the human condition. From a belief in the supremacy 
of reason she comes to the alarming, but enlightened awareness that the 
"established laws" of Neo-classicism are inadequate for this irrational 
world: "Ideas exist in our minds that can be accounted for by no estab-
lished laws." (p. 99) 
Clara's experiences are non-rational, delusive to her senses and confus-
ing to her reason. They are the feminine, secular analogs to Theodore's 
male, religious mania, and they reveal Brown's recording of changing 
world view. No longer do the philosophical premises of the eighteenth 
century explain the real world, for human nature has become a strange, 
mysterious, unknown quantity. Man does not confront reality through 
reference to stable, universal laws of "human nature," but through an 
investigation of the individual imagination, an investigation which is 
consistently stymied by the irrationality of that very same faculty. In 
Brown's other novels, Ormond, Arthur Mervyn, Edgar Huntly, it is the 
examination of the individual mind, especially the unique causes of the 
abnormalities of the imagination, which becomes Brown's subject. In 
Ormond a befuddled Constantia Dudley cannot understand the irrational 
demands of a demonically insane Ormond. Towards the end of that 
novel, Ormond raves that he had the right to kill Constantia's beloved 
father, since he had given money for an operation to cure his blindness. 
He perversely argues that he committed the murder to prove his affection 
for her, and that for killing her father he should have her gratitude, rather 
than her hate: 
My motive was benevolent; my deed conferred a benefit. 
I gave him sight and took away his life, from motives equally 
wise . . . For killing him, therefore, I may claim your grati-
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tude. His death was a . . . offering on the altar of your felic-
ity and mine.18 
Arthur Mervyn, a country boy attempting to fathom the city, is con-
stantly bewildered by a Philadelphia in the grips of yellow fever, a plague 
which cannot be rationally explained. And Edgar Huntly, perhaps 
Brown's most successful single character, readily admits that the tale he 
tells may make no sense: 
Yet am I sure that even now my perturbations are suffi-
ciently stilled for an employment like this? That the inci-
dents I am going to relate can be recalled and arranged with-
out indistinctness and confusion? That emotions will not be 
reawakened by my narrative incompatible with order and 
coherence?19 
An intermittent sleep-walker, Edgar can only promise a glimpse of the 
truth: 
One image runs into another; sensations succeed in so 
rapid a train, that I fear I shall be unable to distribute and 
express them with sufficient perspicuity . . . I shall furnish 
thee with little more than a glimpse of truth. With these 
glimpses, transient and faint as they are, thou must be satis-
fied. (p. 152) 
In fact, his misfortunes take him beyond time and normality into a pecul-
iar existence of his own, an existence apparently on the boundary be-
tween reason and lunacy: "Passage into new forms, overleaping the bars 
of time and space, reversal of the laws of inanimate and intelligent exist-
ence, had been mine to perform and witness." (p. 228) 
In each of these novels, the events arising from the individual's actions 
are non-rational, incapable of explanation by Neo-classical standards. 
The well-defined "laws of inanimate and intelligent existence," the eight-
eenth century laws, have been reversed, and a new, strange, chaotic, ir-
rational world has been revealed. It is Brown's tragedy as an artist that 
he could not manage to create "order out of chaos," that he could not find 
a system which would explain this irrational world he found so energizing 
for his fiction. One result was his failure to create an esthetic form: all of 
Brown's novels are without any real order, and his final two novels, Clara 
Howard and Jane Talbot, indicate a retreat from the difficult struggle 
with an irrational chaos into the safety of traditional, sentimental assump-
tions of novel design. 
If Brown could have formed a new "order out of chaos," we might 
date American literary Romanticism from 1801 instead of 1836; Emerson 
offered America an answer to a world that no longer existed as a carefully 
running watch, that had become increasingly irrational by eighteenth cen-
tury standards. It is undoubtedly correct to describe the American Ro-
mantic movement as largely a Transcendentalist phenomenon, but we 
should not forget the extensive documentary of Romantic-Neo-classical 
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tensions recorded by the early American novel; the two most significant 
novelists of the Age of Jefferson document a state of flux in American 
ideas at the beginning of the nineteenth century. 
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Romantic assertion, and that his extended use of the irrational and mysterious indicates Roman-
tic trends. Modern scholarship has tended to reject Professor Lovejoy's claim that "Romanti-
cism" as a term has no reference or meaning: "On the Discrimination of Romanticisms," 
PMLA, XXXIX (1924), 229-253. See Morse Peckham, "Toward a Theory of Romanticism," 
PMLA, LXVI (1951), 5-23, and "Toward a Theory of Romanticism: I I . 'Reconsiderations,' " 
Studies in Romanticism, I (1962), 1-8. Also see Rene Wellek, "The Concept of 'Romanticism' 
in Literary History," Comparative Literature, I (1949), 1-23, 147-172; and R. A. Foakes, The 
Romantic Assertion (London, 1958). Parts of these studies have been collected and edited by R. 
F. Gleckner and G. E. Enscoe in Romanticism: Points of View (Englewood, N.J., 1962). Invalu-
able for "American Romanticism" is Merle Curti, The Groivth of American Thought (New 
York: third edition, 1964), 225-250. 
11. Foakes, The Romantic Assertion, 39. 
12. Foakes, 41. 
13. Foakes, 39. 
14. Many critics have made this claim; see Cowie, 53; and Carl Van Doren, The American 
Novel, 1789-1939 (New York, 1940), 12. Harvey M. Craft has pointed out many organic (i.e. 
Romantic) elements in Brown's fiction in his dissertation (unpublished, Tulane, 1964), "The 
Opposition of Mechanistic and Organic Thought in the Major Novels of Charles Brockden 
Brown." However, Harry Warfel's biography tends to place Brown with the eighteenth cen-
tury and Neo-classicism: Charles Brockden Brown (Gainesville, 1949). Brown's other modern 
biographer, David Lee Clark, argues somewhat ingenuously that Brown is a "realist": Charles 
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Brockden Brown: Pioneer Voice of America (Durham, 1952). Such polarity of opinion is per-
haps evidence in itself of tension between Romanticism and Neo-classicism in Brown's novels. 
15. Numerous studies of Wieland have discussed this matter in different ways; see Larzer 
Ziff, "A Reading of Wieland;' PMLA, LXXVII (March, 1962), 51-57; William Manly, "The 
Importance of Point of View in Brockden Brown's Wieland;' AL, XXV (1963), 311-321. See 
also the unpublished dissertation (Harvard, 1954) of Warner Berthoff, "The Literary Career of 
Charles Brockden Brown," 116-139; and the unpublished dissertation (Columbia, 1962) of Ken-
neth Bernard, "The Novels of Charles Brockden Brown: Studies in Meaning," 10-24. 
16. I t can be conclusively proven that Carwin does not tell Wieland to kill, and that the 
delusion of a divine command arises from Wieland's religious mania. Proofs for Carwin's inno-
cence of the death command are found in Bernard, 14-18, and Berthoff, 120. 
17. Charles Brockden Brown, Wieland, éd. F. L. Pattee (New York, 1926), 252. Subsequent 
citations from this edition will be included within parentheses in the text itself. 
18. Charles Brockden Brown, Ormond, ed. Leslie Merchand (New York, 1937), 231. 
19. Charles Brockden Brown, Edgar Huntly (Port Washington, N.Y., 1963), 5. All subse-
quent citations from this edition will be included within parentheses in the text of the paper. 
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